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Airport Searches and the Right to Travel:
Some Constitutional Questions
ISTORICALLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL has arisen in
I two contexts. First, it has arisen within the context of the com-
peting interests of the individual to travel internationally and the
interest in national security. The other is that in which an individual
wishes to travel to some area, and the government restricts that right
in an effort to protect the persons in the area to which the individual
wishes to travel.
However, under the current airport screening procedures the
right to travel may be being restricted or interfered with in another
context: prevention and detection of criminal activity. This note
shall survey this constitutional right to travel, as it relates to airport
searches. In addition, it also looks into such areas as governmental
action, probable cause, waiver of fourth amendment rights, and the
rule of exclusion.
After reviewing these areas, one reaches the inescapable con-
clusion that in order to maintain the vitality of the fourth amendment,
courts must apply the rule of exclusion to seized contraband that could
in no way be used to hijack an aircraft.
The Right to Travel
The right to travel domestically and internationally, though not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, has been found to be a
fundamental right. Like many other such rights, it is not an absolute
right. By using a balancing test which the Court has developed, the
right to travel may be restricted in the face of a compelling govern-
mental interest. In addition, the restrictions may not be arbitrary or
capricious and must be reasonably applied.
In view of the fact that there is a high potential for loss of life
and property in hijacking situations, it would appear that reasonable
regulations to protect against hijacking would meet the test of a
compelling governmental interest.
While the right to travel internationally arises from one or two
sources, the right to travel domestically involves several sources.
Domestic Travel
Of the earlier cases dealing with the right of domestic travel,
Crandell v. Nevada,' involved a state's power to tax persons when
they left the state. Nevada argued that under the commerce clause,
173 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
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states had the power to act until Congress legislated in that partic-
ular area in such a way so as to exclude the states.2 Relying on two
earlier cases, 3 the Supreme Court of the United States found that the
tax was not a regulation and did not constitute a violation of the com-
merce clause.4
However, the Court went on to find that the power of the federal
government to raise armies required citizens to move from state to
state and that such a tax would be a hindrance to the operation of the
government.5 Similarly, the Court also found that individuals had
rights as national citizens and that in order to exercise those rights,
individuals had the right to freely "pass and repass" through the
states.6
A similar problem confronted the Court in Edwards v. California7
in which the petitioner had violated a state criminal statute which
made it unlawful for a person to bring an indigent into the state. The
petitioner argued that the statute infringed upon the right to travel.
The Court agreed and found that the right arose under the commerce
clause.8 Justice Douglas felt that the right to travel was protected
from state interference by the fourteenth amendment, and that the
right arose from our "national citizenship".9
Justice Douglas' use of the fourteenth amendment to establish a
right to travel was not novel. In Williams v. Fear,10 the petitioner was
convicted under a state statute for failing to pay a tax on employing
migrant workers, and appealed on the grounds that the tax was burden-
some. The Court found in striking down the tax that it violated per-
sonal rights and liberties secured by the fourteenth amendment."
More recently, another constitutional source for the right to travel
has developed. In Shapiro v. Thompson,12 the petitioner was denied
federal welfare benefits on the grounds that he did not meet the state's
residency requirements. Under the program, Congress gave the states
21d. at 41.
3See Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865); Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
4 Crandell v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 41 (1867).
Id. at 44.
6 Id. at 48-9. See also Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); Norris v. Boston, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
7 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
8Id. at 172, citing Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1940); United States v. Hill, 248
U.S. 420, 423 (1918); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203 (1884).
9 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
10 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
11 Id. at 174. See also Twinning v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
12394 U.S. 617 (1968).
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the power to promulgate eligibility rules and regulations, and the
petitioner asserted that this was violative of the equal protection
clause and infringed upon their constitutional right to travel. The
Court concluded:
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our
Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal
liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited
by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden
or restrict this movement. 13
Another significant aspect which distinguishes Shapiro from previous
cases in this area is the direct involvement of the federal government
in authorizing rules and regulations which unconstitutionally restrict
travel.
In United States v. Guest,14 the Court found that a citizen's right
to travel was protected from state action, or one acting under color
of state authority, by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."i
The constitutional right to travel from one State to another,
and necessarily to use highways and other instrumentalities
of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fun-
damental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right
that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized. 16
(emphasis added)
Foreign Travel
Cases dealing with the right to international travel do not
utilize the variety of sources as do those cases dealing with domestic
travel. Essentially, the first amendment, and the due process clause
of the fifth amendment, are the sources from which the right to inter-
national travel arises. At the same time, it should be noted that there
is a stronger governmental interest involved in international travel.
Kent v. Dulles17 involved the denial of a passport by the Secre-
tary of State on the grounds of the petitioner's affiliation with the
Communist Party or a related organization. In finding the denial un-
constitutional, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found that:
131d. at 629.
14383 U.S. 745 (1966).
lId. at 755.
161d. at 757; see the opinion of Harlan, J., at 763 et seq. for a summary of the area.
17 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
[Vol. 23:90
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The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which the
citizen can not be deprived without due process of the law
under the Fifth Amendment.' 8
The Court also found that the Secretary of State could not be given
unbridled or discretionary authority to grant or withhold passports,
and that whatever rules he used to govern his decisions would be nar-
rowly construed.1 9
Governmental Interference
Like the area of domestic travel, the right to international travel
is not absolute. In Zemel v. Rusk,20 which involved the denial of a
passport, the Court found that:
... the fact that a liberty can not be inhibited without due
process of law does not mean that it can under no circum-
stances be inhibited.2'
In arriving at this and other decisions the Court indicated that it
will use a balancing test between the interest of the government in
protecting itself, and a citizen's right to travel.2 2 In dissent, Justice
Douglas argued that the right to travel is closely allied with the first
amendment and that any restrictions should be narrowly construed,
particularly in peacetime.
2 3
With the Court's balancing approach in the field of international
travel, it is not surprising that a similar approach is also used when
dealing with questions involving domestic travel. In Zemel, this very
problem was dealt with in the following manner:
The right to travel within the United States is of course
also constitutionally protected, cf. Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 86 L. Ed. 119, 62 S. Ct. 164. But that freedom does
not mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire or pestilence can-
not be quarantined when it can be demonstrated that un-
8ld. at 125.
19Id. at 129. See also Apthecker v. Secretary, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kraus v. Dulles, 235 F.2d
840 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Schachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cit. 1955); Copeland v.
Secretary of State, 220 F.Supp. 20 (S.D.N.Y.), motion to advance denied, mem., 376 U.S.
967, vacated (in light of Aptheker, supra), 378 U.S. 588 (1964); Boudin v. Dulles, 136
F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F.Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952); Hurwitz, judicial Control Over Passport
Policy, 20 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 271 (1971).
20381 U.S. 1, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965).
21 Id. at 14.
2 In Zemel, the petitioner asserted his right to travel on the ground that he wanted to be
better informed about social and economic conditions in Cuba. The Court found the govern-
ment's interest in protecting citizens to be controlling.
2 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 26 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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limited travel to the area would directly and materially
interfere with the safety and welfare of the area or the
Nation as a whole. 24
This balancing test has been used to restrict the domestic travel of a
Japanese-American citizen during wartime 25 and that of citizens in
a particular locale during periods of civil disorder.26
From this it becomes evident that with the dangers involved in
hijacking there is clearly a compelling governmental interest to justify
the current airport security searches.
Private or Governmental Action?
The current set of FAA regulations providing for passenger
screening procedures is the method by which the government seeks
to protect life and property. However, under the procedures, inde-
pendent contractors to the airlines conduct the searches and therefore
the question arises as to whether there is true governmental action
or whether the searches are private action. Regardless of the theory
used, the current screening procedures are conducted as a result of
government order and regulation, and therefore establish the requisite
government involvement to make these searches and seizures govern-
mental activity.
It is basic to the fourth amendment that the rights secured are
a bar to government interference. This doctrine was illustrated in the
Court's 1927 decision in Burdeau v. McDowell.2 Here the government
obtained incriminating evidence only after it had been seized by a
private person acting on his own accord. The Court found no govern-
ment involvement and Justice Day concluded that:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlaw-
ful searches and seizures, and as shown in the previous cases,
its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon
activities of sovereign authority ....
By the same token, purely private action is not subject to the con-
stitutional restraints of the fourth amendment. Cases involving
searches and seizures by private individuals, where there is no gov-
ernment involvement or encouragement, have resulted in the courts'
refusing to recognize fourth amendment restraints and suggesting
that any redress would have to be sought through private litigation.2
24Id. at 15-16.
25 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
26 United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971).
27256 U.S. 465 (1921).
2Id. at 475.
29See, e.8., Sackler v. Sackler, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61, aff'd, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 1962).
[Vol. 23 :90
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Not all fact patterns fall neatly into either the "governmental
action" or the "non governmental action" category, which raises the
question of how extensively the government must be involved before
the courts recognize governmental action in a given search and seizure
situation. In those cases which have presented this question, courts
have in general broadly defined the concept of governmental action in
an effort to maintain the vitality of the fundamental rights involved.
In Byars v. United States,30 state police with a proper search warrant
confiscated illegal liquor. Before leaving to seize the liquor, the state
officers asked a federal agent to accompany them. The federal agent
did not have a search warrant nor did he have any reason for not
obtaining one before he went with the state officers. In reversing the
petitioner's conviction, the Court concluded that:
The Fourth Amendment was adopted in view of long misuse
of power in the matter of searches and seizures both in Eng-
land and in the colonies; and the assurance against any re-
vival of it, so carefully embodied in the fundamental law, is
not to be impaired by judicial sanction of equivocal methods,
which, regarded superficially, may seem to escape the chal-
lenge of illegality but which, in reality, strike at the sub-
stance of the constitutional right.31
Thus, it is apparent that courts will not allow strained arguments
by the government that individuals were acting on their own, made in
an effort to avoid a finding of governmental action and the consequent
restraints of the fourth amendment. 32
More specifically, United States v. Lopez33 involved an airline
employee who altered a federal hijacker profile in such a way so as
to destroy the profile's objectivity. The profile was the creation of
the government, through the FAA; it purported to set out objective
criteria, to aid airline employees and U.S. Marshals in identifying
potential hijackers.
While the abuse in this case was by airline officials, not the
government, these employees were acting as government
agents insofar as they designated "selectees" and alerted
Marshals.3"
However, under current FAA regulations, the profile is no longer
in use, and a reassessment of the area is therefore necessary. Under
o 273 U.S. 28 (1926); see also Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 317 (1927).
31 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33-34 (1926).
32See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 266-67 (1960).
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the statutes which provide for the regulations requiring airport
screening, 5 each airline must be certified. This certification may be
revoked for failure to comply with the FAA's regulations. 36 The effect
is clear. The airlines have no other course to follow but to comply
with the regulations or lose their certificates to operate.
The history of these regulations is one of reaction, in that they
were put into effect sooner than planned because of increasing in-
cidents of hijacking.37 The current regulations require the airlines
to establish search procedures and submit the plans for approval by
the FAA.38 The approved plans call for the inspection of every person's
carry-on luggage and their being required to pass through a magnet-
ometer which detects quantities of metal which the person may be
carrying. Subsequently, the FAA promulgated regulations requiring
the presence of armed law enforcement officers during the screening
process.9 It is significant that in announcing this regulation, the FAA
acknowledged its own involvement in what was termed a "framework
of shared responsibility. '4 The officers are to be armed, in uniform
with a badge and "other indicia of authority," and vested with the
power to arrest under federal, state, and local laws.41 On February 27,
1973, the FAA further delineated the duties of the law enforcement
officers by announcing that the officer's presence was to "provide im-
mediate response to actual or suspected violations of the law. 42
Because the airlines must comply with these regulations in order
to continue in business, they and their employees and agents are
forced into the position of becoming government agents carrying out
procedures required and approved by the government.
Cases dealing with airport searches and specifically with the
question of whether such searches and seizures constitute govern-
mental action are not of great assistance. In Corngold v. United
States,4 an airline employee opened cartons which contained stolen
merchandise. This was done at the request of a federal agent who did
not have a search warrant and had no apparent reason for not getting
one. In reversing the conviction the court found that:
3549 U.S.C. §1301 et seq. 1970).
3 49 U.S.C. §1371 (g). See also 49 U.S.C. §1472 (a) for criminal sanctions Hearings on Air-
craft Hijacking Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., at 101
(1970).
37 See 14 C.F.R. §121.538 (1972).
38Id.
-9 14 C.F.R. §107.4 (1973).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 14 C.F.R. §107.1(e) (1973).
4367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966).
[Vol.23:90
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The fruits of a search conducted solely in aid of the
enforcement of a federal statute, as this one was, are inad-
missible when the search failed to meet Fourth Amendment
standards. (Citations omitted) The search was in substance
a federal search, cast in the form of a carrier inspection to
enable the officers to avoid the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.4 (emphasis added)
In another case, United States v. Small,45 a private individual was
following the request of a federal agent. Here, the private individual
changed the lock on a traveler's locker so that its user would be
unable to open it. When the user could not open the locker he re-
ported it to the company and was subsequently arrested. The court
granted a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that it was
not in the employee's normal scope and course of employment to
change locks, and that he did so only because of the request by the
government.4
6
From this it becomes apparent that the requisite governmental
action arises wherever a private individual acts upon a government
"request" or order, or if a government agent oversees the procedure.
In those cases where no government action is found, the dis-
tinguishing factor is that the private individual acts out of personal
suspicion or out of a contractual relationship which creates the right
to inspect.4 7 In Gold v. United States,a the same court which decided
Corngold found that the inspection was motivated by personal sus-
picion. Here, the government agent told the carrier that he suspected
that certain boxes contained obscene film. The boxes were opened by
the carrier after the government agent left and at no time did the
agent request that they be opened. 49 This search was upheld, but can
easily be distinguished from the current airline searches because the
latter are not conducted at the airline's discretion.
Since the current screenings were not instituted until required
by the FAA, the conclusion compelled by the facts is that such searches
are ". . . solely in aid of the enforcement of a federal statute .. .,,so
or regulations. Therefore, it would be difficult to understand how
there could be a denial of governmental action.
4Id. at 5.
4 297 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mass. 1969).
"Id. at 585.
47 See United States v. Blum, 329 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
4378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967). See also United States v. Burton, 341 F. Supp. 302 (W.D.
Mo. 1972).
49 Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1967).
50 Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1966).
1974]
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Additionally, the Court has found that the fourteenth amendment
bars private individuals, acting under the color of state law, from de-
priving others of their constitutional rights." Congress has sought to
enforce this with legislation. 2 However, it is not the states' regula-
tions, but those of the federal government, which are being carried
out. The problem presented is that the federal government may be
committing acts which federal legislation or the Constitution prohibit
the states from doing.
For a possible solution, some guidance may be obtained from
Boling v. Sharpe3 which involved school segregation in the District
of Columbia. The argument advanced by the District of Columbia was
that since it was under the authority of the federal government and
was not a state, the fourteenth amendment would not apply. The Court
concluded, in an unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Warren,
that:
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools,
it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government. 54
The Court found that to impose such a lesser duty would constitute a
violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Therefore,
since the fourteenth amendment prohibits individuals acting under
color of state authority from committing unconstitutional acts, the
fifth amendment should have the same effect on persons acting under
color of federal authority.
Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights and Consent Searches
The rights secured by the fourth amendment are certainly fun-
damental to our national heritage, and they should not be discarded
even in the face of high potential risk of loss of life and property.
'To insure their vitality and continued existence, every effort should
be made to guarantee that acts which constitute a waiver of those
rights should be freely, voluntarily, and intelligently given. Also, in
order to guarantee that those rights are not subordinated to other
fundamental constitutional freedoms, there should be a required warn-
ing much like those given for the fifth and sixth amendments. This
is particularly important where two such fundamental and conflict-
ing interests collide in the setting of the current screening procedures.
Under those procedures, though, it is impossible to find that such
searches are consent searches or that there is a waiver of rights.
51 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
242 U.S.C. §1983 (1970).
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
4 Id. at 500. See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
[Vol.23:90
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Courts have indulged in a heavy presumption against consent
searches. This presumption against consent was firmly established in
Johnson v. Zerbst.55 Mr. Justice Black wrote:
It has been pointed out that "courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional
rights and that we "do not presume acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an in-
tentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege.5 (emphasis added)
In Weed v. United States, 57 the petitioner was faced with a sit-
uation wherein the police had drawn their guns, taken the peti-
tioner into custody and told him that they did not have a search
warrant, but could get one. The Court held that ". . . under these
circumstances, the alleged consent was not freely and intelligently
given." 8 One wonders how a person can intelligently give consent to
a search unless he has been informed of his right to insist upon a
warrant.
Of interest is Johnson v. United States,59 wherein a federal agent
smelled burning opium coming from under the petitioner's hotel door.
After knocking on the door and having the petitioner open it, the
agent told her, "I want to talk to you a little bit." The petitioner then
stepped aside and the agent entered the hotel room. The agent told
her to consider herself under arrest and proceeded to search the room.
In reversing the conviction, Justice Jackson said:
Entry to defendent's living quarters, which was the be-
ginning of the search, was demanded under color of office.
It was granted in submission to authority rather than as
an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional
right.60 (emphasis added)
The Court went further to develop this doctrine of effective con-
sent in saying that to permit this type of consent would allow the
undermining of the basic thrust of the fourth amendment.
61
It becomes clear that in order for a consent search to be effective,
it must be freely, voluntarily, and intelligently given. Nor can there
Is 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
9 Id. at 464.
57340 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965).
s Id. at 829. See also Wren v. United States, 352 F.2d 617 (loth Cit. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 944 (1966).
59333 U.S. 10 (1947).
60 Id. at 13.
61 Id. at 17.
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be an effective waiver of one's constitutional rights as a condition
precedent to the exercise of another constitutional right such as the
right to travel.6 2 Therefore, by merely presenting oneself at the board-
ing gate, there can not be an implied waiver of fourth amendment
rights, nor can there be such a waiver as a condition precedent to
the right to travel.
Of interest in the area of consent searches, particularly in view
of the close interaction between the fourth and fifth amendments, is
the theory of the necessity of a verbal or written warning63 in order
for there to be an effective consent to the search. This exact issue,
in an airport search situation, arose in United States v. Muellener."
Here, a defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a
pat-down search was granted on the grounds that the defendant was
not warned that he had a choice of being searched or not being per-
mitted to board the aircraft.
To meet Fourth Amendment guarantees, the prospective pas-
senger must be advised that he has to submit to a search if
he wants to board the plane, but that he can decline to be
searched if he chooses not to board the aircraft.65
The basis of the argument requiring a warning is that to intel-
ligently waive a right, one must be aware of its existence.66 Miranda
v. Arizona67 provided that a person could effectively waive his con-
stitutional rights, ". . . provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently.'"6 (emphasis added) More importantly,
the Court also found that in order for there to be an intelligent
waiver, the person had to be informed of his constitutional rights.
In those cases which have recognized the claim that in order for
a consent to be effective there must be a warning, the basic issue
was whether the person felt that he was in custody, i.e., that his
freedom was restricted to a significant degree. In United States v.
Blalock 69 the court was faced with this exact problem where the de-
62 Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 595 (1926); United States v. Allen,
349 F. Supp. 749, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077,
1092-3 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
63 See Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
130 (1967); Comment, Constitutional Law - Miranda v. Arizona and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 46 N.C. L. REv. 142 (1967).
"351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
6SId. at 1289-90.
"See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1947); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304, U.S. 458,
464 (1938); Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1965).
67 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6Id. at 444. See also Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
69255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
[Vol.23:90
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fendant was approached by law enforcement officers in a hotel lobby.
After escorting him to the men's room where he was frisked, they
took him to his room. Upon entering the room the agents asked if
they could look around, and in doing so found incriminating evidence.
In granting the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence because
of the failure of the agents to warn the defendant that he did not
have to consent, the court said:
The agents here properly warned defendant of his right to
counsel and his right to remain silent, but they did not warn
him of his right to refuse a warrantless search. The Fourth
Amendment requires no less knowing a waiver than do the
Fifth and Sixth.7" (emphasis added)
The court went on to find that the government had failed in its
burden of proving that there was an intelligent waiver and consent. 71
With regard to the standard to be used as to whether a person
feels his liberty has been restricted, one court found that the standard
should be a subjective personal one.7 2 It would seem, however, that
such a standard would be unenforceable because of the almost limit-
less range of personal feelings involved in freedom of movement and
the belief as to when that freedom is restricted. Even the reasonable
man standard would be difficult to employ because a jury would have
difficulty understanding the psychological pressures inherent during
custody situations. Studies have shown that persons who are knowledg-
able about the law are subject to this type of custodial pressure.73
One court has gone so far as to find custody where the defendant was
asked to come to an Internal Revenue office to answer some questions.7 4
Another court has ruled that a defendant is entitled to a warning
where postal inspectors asked the defendant to go to his home to get
some items which later proved to be incriminating. Upon his return
to the authorities he was given the traditional Miranda warning, but
the court found the warning to be ineffective. 7
5
This emerging doctrine has also gained some recognition in state
courts. Two cases decided by the California Supreme Court have
approved this theory. One case involved early morning "raids" by
welfare workers to investigate homes which were receiving Aid to
Jo Id. at 269.
71 Id. at 270.
72 United States v. Gower, 271 F. Supp. 655, 661 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
73 See Survey -Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519,
1591 (1967). See also Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact
of Wyman J. James, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259, 1299 (1971); Johnson, The Supreme Court
of California 1967-1968, 56 CAL. L. REV. 1612, 1617 (1968).
74 See United States v. Gower, 271 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
7
-United States v. Pellegrini, 309 F. Supp. 250, 256-7 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
19741
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol23/iss1/36
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Dependent Children. 76 The appellant welfare worker refused to take
part in these raids on the grounds that they were unconstitutional.
After refusing, the appellant was discharged for insubordination and
brought suit on the ground that he could not be discharged for refus-
ing to take part in an unlawful activity. Justice Tobriner, speaking
for the majority, said:
We need not determine here whether a request for entry,
voiced by one in a position of authority under circumstances
which suggest that some official reprisal might attend a
refusal, is itself sufficient to vitiate an affirmative response
by an individual who has not been apprised of his Fourth
Amendment rights . . . . These circumstances nullify the
legal effectiveness of the apparent consent secured by the
• . . searchers.77
In People v. Arnold,78 the same court found a need for a warning
of fourth amendment rights on the grounds that the defendant's free-
dom of movement had been restricted; the court attempted to define
custody in the following manner:
[W] hether defendant is placed in a situation in which he rea-
sonably believes that his freedom of movement is restricted
by pressures of official authority ....
... [H] e may reasonably believe that if he attempts to
leave the interrogation chamber the authorities will impose
immediate detention. 9 (emphasis added)
In those cases which reject the need for a warning of fourth
amendment rights, the court has either refused to accept the de-
fendant's contention that his freedom of movement has been re-
stricted," or has found that the search was incident to a lawful
arrest.8 1 In one of the latter cases, the court found that a warning
requirement for a search would degrade the required warnings for
the fifth and sixth amendments.82 However, implicit in such an argu-
ment is that the rights secured by the fourth amendment are some-
how "below" or less important than those secured by the fifth and
sixth amendments. Such reasoning is unsound and untenable, and
must be rejected.
76 Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
rId. at 266-67, 425 P.2d at 229-30, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 629-30.
78 66 Cal. 2d 438,426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
79Id. at 443, 426 P.2d at 520, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
80See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cit.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837
(1969).
81 United States v. Gorman, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cit. 1967).
82 1d. at 164.
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Probable Cause to Search
Essentially, the current procedures for airport searches consist
of a search of each person's carry-on luggage and then requiring the
person himself to pass through a magnetometer. Merely approaching
the boarding gate can hardly be sufficient probable cause for either
the luggage search or the magnetometer scan. With a high reading
on the magnetometer, there may be sufficient suspicion for a strictly
limited pat-down search for items that could be used in a hijacking.
Historically over the past fifty to fifty-five years, various decisions
have been handed down in an effort to define probable cause. In Carrol
v. United States, 83 Chief Justice Taft found that where an officer knew
that an individual had a history of lawbreaking and was presently
conducting himself in the same manner, the officer had probable
cause to conduct a search.8 However, the Court cautioned that:
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition
agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance
of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using
the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a
search.8 5 (emphasis added)
A year later, in 1925, the Court found that probable cause re-
quired more than a mere belief that contraband was concealed in a
particular location.86 The question as to what was required remained
open, and what eventually developed was a "reasonably prudent
man" doctrine. In its application, this doctrine is dependent upon the
particular fact pattern. Justice Rutledge said:
The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is
a reasonable ground for belief .... (citations omitted)
. . . [T]he rule of probable cause is a practical, non-
technical conception affording the best compromise that
has been found for accommodating these often opposing
interests. 7
The majority of the Court found that under the reasonably prudent
man doctrine, the officer's belief would have to arise out of personal
observation or knowledge,8 or arise from a reliable informant's giv-
- 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
" Id. at 159-62. See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1962).
'
5Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-4 (1924).
16 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
87 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1948). Rutledge, J., was speaking of the
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ing information which was subsequently corroborated.8 9 Once these
suspicions were aroused beyond the point of mere belief 9 or good
faith,91 the officer was to act in the manner of a reasonable man.
He would not be required to be a legal technician.92 Under this line
of reasoning, unless the officer had prior information regarding an
individual, there could hardly be probable cause for either a luggage
or magnetometer search resulting from the approach of a prospec-
tive passenger at a boarding gate.
The "balancing of interests" of which Justice Rutledge spoke in
Brinegar93 was the determining factor in the Court's decisions in-
volving the warrantless searches in Terry v. Ohio" and Sibron v. New
York. 95 In these cases, the Court found that two criteria had to be
met before a "protective pat-down search" could take place. First,
there had to be a reasonable fear on the part of an officer for his safety
or for the safety of others, 96 and second, the invasion had to be limited
in scope and nature.9 7
Several courts have attempted to apply Terry and Sibron to air-
port searches. In United States v. Lopez," the defendant's motion
to suppress was granted because an airline employee had altered the
hijacker profile, making it invalid. However, before granting the mo-
tion, the court found that, but for the alteration, the search would
have been justified in light of the circumstances. The defendant had
triggered the magnetometer and had failed to produce satisfactory
identification. With specific regard to the magnetometer, the court
found that it was merely one in a number of steps in selecting people
to be frisked but indicated that without prior justification, the use
of the magnetometer might be objectionable. 10 This is particularly
important inasmuch as the profile is no longer being used.
89See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1966); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959).
90 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
91 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
92Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1948).
9 Id.
M4392 U.S. 1 (1967).
95 392 U.S. 40 (1967).
"Terry V. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
" Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1967).
98 It should be noted that no cases have been found under the procedures that require every
person to be searched; this will be discussed infra.
"-328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. N.Y. 1971). See also United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d
Cir. 1972).
100United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1100 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
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A "tip" from an airline employee, bulging pockets, failure to
produce satisfactory identification, and extremely anxious behavior
were sufficient probable cause for a U.S. Marshal to stop and frisk a
passenger in United States v. Lindsey.10'
In United States v. Epperson,10 2 the court upheld the defendant's
conviction based on evidence seized in an airport search. Epperson
differed from Lopez and Lindsey in that the frisk was based solely
on a high reading on the magnetometer. There was no evidence of a
profile raising any suspicion in the Marshal's mind, yet the court felt
that the use of the magnetometer was not a violation of the fourth
amendment. 03
Though the case law is limited, it appears that some courts will
approve searches only where there has been something in addition
to or separate from a high reading on the magnetometer. As was
pointed out in Lopez, the use of the magnetometer alone might very
well be objectionable. Without some prior indication, it is unlikely
that there are sufficient factors to establish probable cause, or the
Terry requirement of suspicion of fear for one's safety, to warrant
the use of a magnetometer to search a person.
With regard to searching carry-on luggage, in People v. Sor-
tina,'04 the court granted defendant's motion to suppress on the ground
that probable cause was lacking. Here, an airline employee was warned
of possible hijackings and became suspicious of the defendant. The
resulting search disclosed contraband. Because the employee was
unable to explain his reasons for suspecting the defendant, the court
found that there was no probable cause. 05
In People v. Erdman,106 the court rejected the government's claim
that there was probable cause. Here, there was no use of the mag-
netometer, or a profile, nor was there any unusual behavior. The
sole justification for the search was a bulge in the defendant's pocket.
The court held that this alone was not enough to satisfy the require-
ments under Terry.W
Even where the search was justified at its inception the courts
have found that under the Terry guidelines, the search must be
strictly limited to its "objectives." Two cases demonstrate this prin-
ciple in the airport screening situation.
1 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1971).
102454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
103Id. at 771.
104 325 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
s
05 Id. at 476.
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In United States v. Kroll,"' the court found that the search ex-
ceeded reasonableness when a Marshal insisted on finding out what
was creating a one-fourth inch bulge in a white business envelope.
The court concluded that the search had to be limited to those items
which could reasonably conceal weapons.109 Similarly, in United States
v. Meulener °10 a search of a person's carry-on luggage was justified
only after a pat-down failed to disclose any weapons.
Under the Fourth Amendment, the Marshal does not have a
blank check to search anything in the suspect's possession,
and may not search the suitcase without an initial pat-down
search for weapons that falls within Terry."'
From this brief review it would appear there is no probable cause
or suspicion for either a magnetometer or luggage search, either by
hand or by x-ray machine, merely as a result of a prospective pas-
senger's arrival at a boarding gate.
Application of the Exclusionary Rule
In the final analysis the question arises whether those items
seized during an airport search which could in no way be used to
hijack an aircraft are admissible as evidence in a criminal proceed-
ing. It would appear that the answer is "no," and that such evidence
should be suppressed.
Under the rule established in Weeks v. United States,"2 items
seized during an unlawful search can not be introduced into evidence
in a federal criminal proceeding. The Court concluded that such a
rule was necessary to protect the vitality of the fourth amendment.
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and
held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring
his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is
of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts
of the courts and their officers to bring the guilty to punish-
ment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles .... 1
108 351 F.Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
109 Id. at 153.
110351 F.Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
111 Id. at 1292.
112232 U.S. 382 (1914).
113d. at 393.
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In order to protect those great principles the Court concluded that
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence was the only remedy.114
Since the exclusionary rule was established, it has survived the
test of review and application and has tended to gain strength. In
subsequent decisions it has been expanded to include the books of a
corporation,115 a person's "effects" 1 6 and evidence admitted in state
courts.117 Perhaps Justice Holmes gave the strongest statement sup-
porting the doctrine shortly after its creation when he wrote:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so ac-
quired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not
be used at all.116
As indicated earlier, there are fundamental questions regarding
the constitutional requisite of probable cause. In the absence of a
profile as one of a number of indicators, it is doubtful whether a high
reading on a magnetometer is sufficient probable cause for a Terry
pat-down.119 Without probable cause, and recognizing that it is all
but impossible to establish a consent search under the circumstances,
it is difficult to find a constitutional basis for sustaining such searches.
With regard to the other component of the airport searches, those
of a prospective passenger's carry-on luggage, where there is no
consent to search, and in the absence of "nervous" behavior, there
would be no probable cause. Surely, by a passenger's approach at a
boarding gate, probable cause can not be found for searching his
carry-on luggage.120 With the exception of Terry, without the requisite
probable cause, the searches and resulting seizures of items that could
not be used to hijack aircraft are illegal and must be suppressed
under the Weeks doctrine.
As just noted, a search may be constitutional under Terry. How-
ever, Terry sets out the requirement that such a search will be per-
mitted only when the officer reasonably fears for his own safety or
for the safety of others. In addition, such a search must be limited to
the objects of the search. The object of airport searches is the dis-
114 See Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkin v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
11s Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 358 (1920).
116 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
11 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
118 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 358, 392 (1920).
119 See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1100 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
120See Carrol v. United States. 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1924).
19741
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covery and seizure of weapons used for hijacking aircraft. Anything
else discovered and seized would be beyond the permissible scope of
the search and must be suppressed 21
It becomes readily apparent that regardless of the justification
for, or the doctrines used to support the current airport screening pro-
cedures, those items found and seized must be suppressed as evidence
in a criminal proceeding.
Summary
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has found a consti-
tutional right to travel. Like most other constitutional rights, the right
to travel is not absolute, and under certain circumstances the govern-
ment has been permitted to interfere with it, or restrict its exercise.
Usually the interference is for the protection of the individual or the
State. However, in the context of the current airport search pro-
cedures, the government's interference is premised upon the detection
and prevention of potential serious criminal activity: hijacking. Ulti-
mately, the question arises whether these procedures are constitutional
under the fourth amendment.
In order for the question to arise under the fourth amendment,
there must be governmental activity. Under the current case law it
would seem that the procedures being used would constitute the
requisite degree of governmental involvement. Moreover, there would
appear to be no consent, either express or implied, by the airline pas-
sengers to such searches, and probable cause would appear to be lack-
ing in that every piece of carry-on luggage and every passenger is
searched.
As a result, the searches being conducted at airports do not meet
constitutional standards, which places the courts in a dilemma. The
courts can either find a new basis for searches without consent or
probable cause, or they can continue to exclude such items that could
not be used to hijack an aircraft, as evidence in a criminal proceeding.
It is urged that in order to maintain and preserve the vitality of the
fourth amendment, and the rights that it protects, courts should
employ the latter of the two and exclude such evidence from a criminal
proceeding.
Donald Applesteint
121 See United States v. Kroll, 351 F. Supp. 148, 153 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
t Law Review Editor; third-year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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